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ABSTRACT 
        This paper considers a job search model where the environment is not constant 
throughout the unemployment spell and where jobs do not last forever. In this situation, 
reservation wages can be lower than they would be in a model without consideration of 
such separations, but also they can initially be higher precisely because of this non-
stationarity of the model. Moreover, the time-dependence of reservation wages is 
stronger than it is when separations are not controlled for. The model is estimated 
structurally by using Spanish data for the period 1985-1996. The main finding is that, 
although at the beginning the decrease in reservation wages is the main determinant of 
the exit from unemployment, as time progresses the job offer arrival rate comes to be 
the only significant factor, given that acceptance probabilities become equal to one. The 
estimated parameters are used to evaluate the effect of different Unemployment 
Insurance designs on unemployment duration. Accordingly, one can draw the conclusion 
that a sufficiently decreasing pattern in unemployment benefits makes this duration to 
be 8.4% lower. 
 
Key words: Job Search, Nonstationarity, Unemployment, Separation probability, 
Structural estimation, Unemployment Insurance. 
JEL classification: C41, J64. 
 
RESUMEN 
  Este artículo considera un modelo de búsqueda de empleo donde el contexto del 
individuo no permanece constante a lo largo de la experiencia de desempleo y donde los 
empleos no son para siempre. En esta situación, los salarios de reserva pueden ser 
menores que lo que hubieran sido en un modelo que no considere la probabilidad de 
despido, pero también pueden ser inicialmente mayores a causa de la no 
estacionariedad del modelo. Además, se demuestra que la dependencia temporal de los 
salarios de reserva es mayor cuando se tiene en cuenta la probabilidad de despido. El 
modelo es estimado estructuralmente usando datos españoles para el periodo 1985-
1996. El principal resultado es que, aunque al principio el decrecimiento de los salarios 
de reserva es el principal determinante de la tasa de salida del desempleo, a medida que 
pasa el tiempo, es la tasa de llegada de ofertas el único determinante de dicha tasa, 
dado que la probabilidad de aceptación de ofertas se estima idénticamente igual a uno. 
Los parámetros estimados son utilizados para evaluar el efecto de diseños alternativos 
de las prestaciones por desempleo en España. La principal conclusión de esta simulación 
es que unas prestaciones suficientemente decrecientes con la duración del desempleo, 
harían que esta duración fuera un 8.4% inferior a la observada. 
 
Clasificación JEL: J64. 
Palabras clave: Búsqueda de empleo, no estacionariedad, desempleo, despido, 
estimación estructural, prestaciones por desempleo. 
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Recently, a great deal of research has been carried out on the job search behavior
of unemployed workers. The analysis of unemployment duration has become an
important way to better understand the issues behind the unemployment rate as
an aggregate ﬁgure. The classic labor supply model cannot explain important
features of the typical problem faced by an unemployed worker who is searching
for a job. Job search models, however, study the problem of an unemployed
worker searching for a new job in a dynamic and uncertain world. All this results
in the worker maximizing his expected wealth by using a stopping strategy based
on accepting any oﬀer with an associated wage higher than a critical value called
the reservation wage.
A traditional assumption in these models has been stationarity: parameters
determining worker behavior are commonly assumed to be constant throughout
the unemployment spell. But this assumption is often at variance with reality:
reduced-form estimations of job search models usually show a manifest negative
duration dependence of the re-employment probability, even when unobserved
heterogeneity is controlled for (among others, see Meyer (1990) for US data,
Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) for UK data, or Bover, Arellano and Ben-
tolila (2002) for Spanish data). This time dependence turns the solution to the
worker’s problem into non-stationary throughout his unemployment spell. Such
time dependence is supported by, for example, the lower number of oﬀers received
by long-term unemployed workers or the usual decreasing pattern in unemploy-
ment beneﬁts.
There has been a deep advance in the structural estimation of job search
models in recent years, being this advance focused on Equilibrium Search Models
(see Bontemps et al., 1999, 2000). These models take into account that the search
process is the result of two agents’ decisions: the worker and the ﬁrm. Although
the present paper is based on a partial equilibrium search model where the part of
the ﬁrm is not studied, there is still much to be learned from the search behavior
of unemployed workers, specially from the fact that this behavior is not constant
throughout the unemployment spell. To concentrate on this aspect we need to
leave other parts of the model as simple as possible and this is the reason of the
partial equilibrium approach.
The contribution of this paper is the introduction of new element that has
not been considered in previous non-stationary job search models: an exogenous
separation probability, which can represent both ﬁring and quitting. In this
situation the unemployed worker knows that once employed, he can leave or
may be compelled to leave the job in the future and become unemployed once
again. One of the most inﬂuential articles in the ﬁeld of non-stationary job
search, Van den Berg (1990), considers nonstationarity in a very general way
but assumes that jobs are held forever, even though he admits the restrictions of
such an assumption. The present paper incorporates the separation probability
in a non-stationary search model. It is well-established that consideration of
1this fact makes the reservation wage more strongly time-dependent than it would
be otherwise.1 Moreover, in a stationary model the eﬀect of this separation
probability on reservation wages is always negative which means that reservation
wages are lower when the separation probability is greater.2 The reason is that
the future is discounted at a higher rate. However, when it is acknowledged
that reservation wages change during the time the worker is unemployed, it is
proved that this eﬀe c ti sn o tt h eo n l yo n ep o s s i b l e : w em a ya l s os e eh i g h e r
reservation wages with a higher separation rate, at least for the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h e
unemployment spell. This result means that, in some situations, the unemployed
worker is more selective when accepting job oﬀers because he knows that the
probability of subsequently losing his job is not zero. But this will only happen
at the beginning of the unemployment spell, when his situation is not so bad.
As time passes, the worker will increasingly want to be employed as soon as
possible, because not only can he achieve better living conditions once in a job,
but also because he realizes that, even after a possible future separation, his
situation as a newly unemployed individual will be better than the one he has
now. This new result is of considerable importance because it oﬀers an alternative
explanation for low exit rates from unemployment in countries like Spain, where
there exists a large separation rate: it is not only unemployment beneﬁts which
make reservation wages to be high and hence the exit rate from unemployment
to be low, but also the interaction of such beneﬁts and the separation rate.3
This paper also has an empirical objective: to structurally estimate the non-
stationary model by using Spanish data for the period 1985-1996. Given that
we have to estimate the model without really taking much heterogeneity into
account, the estimation procedure is reinforced by controlling unobserved hetero-
geneity by means of a mixture technique inspired by Heckman and Singer (1984).
Some simulations about the identiﬁcation of this model with unobserved hetero-
geneity and duration dependence tell us that the structure of the model is able
to distinguish between these two elements.
The main empirical results are as follows. First, the predicted unemploy-
ment hazard rate increases up to the fourth month and decreases thereafter.
The structural estimation indicates that during the ﬁrst four months, decreasing
reservation wages are the main determinant of the hazard rates, but later on
reservation wages fall so low that acceptance probabilities are practically equal
to one. Hence, the hazard is equal to the oﬀer arrival rate, which also tends
to decrease throughout the unemployment spell. The model predicts that those
workers with access to unemployment beneﬁts have a mean expected unemploy-
1Ahn and García-Pérez (2002) show how reservation wages should be highly decreasing in
Spain, given the pattern followed by self-reported wage aspirations in this country.
2In a model where search is also allowed once in the job, the eﬀect of the separation probability
depends on the relationship between the oﬀer arrival rate while employed and unemployed.
3Empirical evidence from the European Community Household Panel shows that the correla-
tion between self-declared reservation wages and unemployment duration is higher in countries
with more presence of temporary contracts, that is, with more risk of separation from the job
(See García Pérez & Rebollo, 2003).
2ment duration of more than ﬁve months whereas those without such beneﬁts have
an expected duration of less than 3.5 months.
Although the estimation procedure imposes some rigidity in the way unem-
ployment beneﬁts are considered, we have done some policy simulations in or-
der to evaluate the eﬀect that diﬀerent Unemployment Insurance designs may
have over the expected unemployment duration. Moreover, we have analyzed
whether the optimal Unemployment Insurance proposed in Hopenhayn and Nicol-
ini (1997a) could have the same eﬀects found for the US but in a economy like
the Spanish one with a much more serious problem of unemployment together
with a high separation rate. Our results show that the best design of unemploy-
ment beneﬁts, in terms of lower expected unemployment duration, is the one
with a highly decreasing replacement rate (going from 70% to 30% in 15 months
turns the expected duration in unemployment into 8.4% lower than it is under
the current Spanish system). We obtain also that the optimal tax proposed in
Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997a) results in a larger decrease in expected unemploy-
ment duration when it is accompanied by a highly decreasing replacement rate.
This is due to our result about reservation wages, having almost no eﬀect over the
exit from unemployment from the ﬁfth month onwards. Moreover, given the high
separation rate in our sample, something missing in their analysis, the worker
is only receiving incentives to accept job oﬀers when the beneﬁts are suﬃciently
decreasing along the unemployment spell.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 deals with the non-
stationary job search model with the separation probability, along with some
simulation exercises which help us to better understand the results of the model.
Section 3 describes the estimation procedure, the data used, and the main results,
and Section 4 presents the main conclusions.
2 The model
I use a standard discrete-time search model (See, for example, Lippman and
McCall, 1976 or Wolpin, 1987) where the parameters are allowed to vary with
unemployment duration. It is based on the continuous-time model of Van den
Berg (1990), but I have modiﬁed it by introducing the probability of being sepa-
rated from the job once employed.4
Consider a discrete-time economy where agents either work receiving a con-
stant wage, w, or are unemployed and searching for a job in each period t.T h e
following conditions are assumed:
(A1) Wage oﬀers at time t are random draws from a distribution function F(w,t)
4The other modiﬁcation with respect to Van den Berg (1990) is the introduction of a discrete-
time framework. The reason for departing from continuous time is not only the ﬁnal objective
of estimating the model using discrete data but also to better understand the eﬀect of the
separation rate. Nevertheless, the continuous version of the model is simply the limit case of
this model. Details on this continuous version can be found in García-Pérez (1998).
3where w ∈ [0,∞) and t is how long the agent has been unemployed.5
(A2) Job oﬀers arrive with probability α(t) in each period t.
(A3) During the spell of unemployment, the agent has an income b(t) ∈ [0,∞),
net of search costs.6
(A4) When an oﬀer is accepted, the agent works at the oﬀered wage, w, but there
is a constant separation probability δ ∈ [0,1].7
(A5) The individual has a constant subjective discount rate r ∈ [0,∞).
(A6) T h e r ee x i s t ss o m ep e r i o dT from which all the parameters depending on
unemployment duration are constant.
These assumptions ensure the appropriate present values to be well-deﬁned
and, therefore, guarantee the existence of an optimal strategy.
The expected present value of future net income for an unemployed worker




[α(t)Ew,t+1 max(W(w),U(t +1 ) )+( 1− α(t))U(t +1 ) ] (1)
Thus, U(t) is the value of unemployment time, b(t), received at the beginning
of period t, plus the expected and discounted value of the optimal stopping deci-
sion at t+1. This expected value is, in the event that an oﬀer arrives in period t,8
the maximum between the expected present value of accepting the oﬀer,W (w),
and continuing to search one more period, U(t +1 ) . If no oﬀer arrives, then the
worker will be unemployed again at period t +1 ,U (t +1 ) .
The expected present value of stopping a job search and beginning to work




[(1 − δ)W(w)+δU(0)] (2)
That is, W(w) is the value of the wage received in period t plus the expected
present value of what can happen in period t +1:with probability 1 − δ, the
worker will continue employed and with the opposite probability the worker will
leave the job and become unemployed again, with a duration of zero periods,
U(0).9
5Calendar time is assumed to start at the moment the individual becomes unemployed. Thus,
t refers both to calendar time and to how long the individual remains unemployed.
6This income can be interpreted as the value of time for the unemployed worker, and includes,
among other things, unemployment beneﬁts and other income.
7That is, the job can be interrupted for any exogenous reason, such us ﬁring or quitting.
This probability can also be a function of accumulated tenure (see below).
8I assume that this oﬀer is received at the end of the period so that we have to apply the
time discount factor to its expected value.
9We could also allow for the separation probability to depend on how much time the worker
has been employed (See García-Perez, 1998). However, given we have no employment duration
data, we may call δ the “mean separation rate”, which is obtained in that paper and takes into
consideration the evolution of such rate from the beginning of the employment spell to inﬁnity.
4In this context, as in all job search models, every time an oﬀer arrives the
decision is whether to accept or to reject it and search further. The individual
will only be indiﬀerent between working and searching for one more period at a














Taking into account that U(0) =
(1+r)wR(0)
r , i.e. the value of U(t) when














where ∆wR(t)=wR(t +1 )− wR(t). It is straightforward to show that wR(0)
satisﬁes this:









From (4) we can distinguish four terms in the reservation wage: (i) the value
of time for the unemployed worker, b(t); (ii) the value associated with a future
job separation, given by the diﬀerence between income in period t and the value
of being again at period 0 of the following unemployment spell; (iii) the expected
and discounted beneﬁt associated with the arrival of a new oﬀer; and, (iv) the
appreciation or depreciation of the option represented by the reservation wage.
Given the expression of the reservation wage, equation (4), we obtain the
unemployment hazard rate, φ(t), which is the probability of exiting unemployment
in t, conditional on not having exited before, which is deﬁned as:
φ(t)=α(t)[1− F(wR(t +1 ) ,t)] (6)
that is, the rate at which oﬀers arrive multiplied by the probability that a given
oﬀer is acceptable. Note that given (1), where the value of accepting a job oﬀer
arriving at the end of period t, is compared with the expected present value of
being unemployed at time t+1, the acceptance probability in period t is computed
taking into account the reservation wage at time t +1 .11
10If the separation probability is taken to be equal to zero, this equation is the same as in
Van den Berg (1990) but in discrete time.
11This is a consequence of discrete time. In continuous time, see García-Pérez (1998), this
acceptance probability would be just 1 − F(wR(t),t).
52.1 Nonstationarity of the reservation wage
The nonstationarity of the reservation wage is derived from the nonstationarity
of the parameters of the model, which is established by the following alternative
assumptions:12
(K1) b(t) >b (t +1 ) , ∀t ∈ [0,T).
(K2) α(t) >α (t +1 ) , ∀t ∈ [0,T).
(K3) F(w,t) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates F(w,t +1 ) , ∀t ∈ [0,T), which
implies that 1 − F(w,t) > 1 − F(w,t+1 ) , ∀w ∈ [0,∞).
(K4) F(w,t) is a mean preserving spread of F(w,t +1 ) ,∀t ∈ [0,T), that is,







The economic meaning of these assumptions is simple. For an unemployed
worker the value of time decreases with unemployment duration because his in-
come and unemployment beneﬁts decline over time. The oﬀer arrival rate and
the wage oﬀered may decrease as time proceeds as a result of the stigma eﬀect
that long-term unemployed workers may suﬀer from (see Berkovitch, 1990). The
distribution of oﬀers can be more concentrated around its mean for the long-term
unemployed, because they may know more about this distribution (see Burdett
and Viswanath, 1988). It is important the assumption that people know how the
parameters are related to the duration of unemployment.
The time dependence exhibited by the reservation wage is obtained in the
following theorem, where it is helpful to use what I call a stationary reservation
wage, w0
R(t). This wage is the optimal reservation wage at time t, for all t ≥ 0,




















Theorem 1 Let assumptions (A1) to (A6) be satisﬁed. Let one parameter sat-
isﬁes assumptions (K1)-(K4) with strict inequality, while the remaining ones are
constant over the time interval [0,∞). Then:
(i) wR(t) <w 0
R(t),
(ii) ∆wR(t) < 0.
12The derivation of the nonstationarity of the reservation wage is similar to Van den Berg
(1990) but in discrete time.
6Proof : See Appendix A.
The meaning of this result is simple: any future decrease in the parameters of
the model makes the value of a current job-search spell smaller than it would be
if the parameters were constant. So the unemployed worker, anticipating these
future changes, sets a smaller reservation wage as his spell of unemployment get
longer.
2.2 The eﬀect of the separation probability
In stationary search models (see, for example, Devine and Kiefer, 1991) the eﬀect
of the separation rate upon reservation wages is negative. Given that the future
is more uncertain, future opportunities are discounted at a higher rate and, thus,
the reservation wage is lower. This is because the value of being employed is
lower when jobs do not last forever. Given this, the value of being unemployed is
also lower and the result is that the minimum acceptable wage for these workers
is smaller.
However, in the present model, the nonstationarity of the search process intro-
duces a new element: being separated from a job is not the same when considered
by an unemployed worker at the beginning of the unemployment spell as it is after
one year of unemployment, for example. This fact can be conﬁrmed by analyzing
equation (4). The eﬀect of the separation probability is not only a direct one,
through the presence of δ in the expression for wR(t), but also an indirect one
because of its eﬀect on wR(0). Hence, in order to obtain the complete eﬀect of
the separation probability we need a general expression for wR(t) as a function
only of exogenous parameters.
This can be obtained by taking into account the fact that equation (4) deter-
mines a system of T +1equations on reservation wages from period 0 to period
T. If we work backwards in this system, we can obtain an expression for wR(0)
and, after substituting in wR(t), obtain the following general expression for the
reservation wage:
wR(t)=( r + δ)PV(b(t)) +PV(E(w,t)) −
δD(t)
1+δD(0)


































































7That is, the reservation wage at time t is the present discounted value, PV (·),
of (r+δ)b(t)+α(t)
R ∞
wR(t+1) wdF(w,t) from period t to period T,minus a fraction
of this present discounted value but from period 0 to T. In these present values,
the discount factor involves all the parameters of the model via the unemployment
hazard rate, φ(t). Hence, this expression takes into account both a time discount,
r, and a probability discount, via the hazard rate. The latter regards whether
the worker is unemployed or not in each of the periods considered.
Before discussing the sign of the derivative of wR(t) with respect to δ,w ec a n
note the following useful result.
Lemma 2 If b(t) is decreasing, the derivative of wR(t) with respect to δ is also
decreasing in t.






















D(t) is a weighted average of the values of b(t) from period t to T
and b(t) is decreasing in t,
PV(b(t))
D(t) is decreasing in t. But this means that
dwR(t)
dδ
will be also decreasing in t because the other terms in this derivative are constant
in t. Q.E.D.
Given this result, we can easily posit a general result for the sign of the deriv-
ative of wR(t) with respect to δ. This is established in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The eﬀect of the separation rate on the reservation wage at period
t,
dwR(t)



























Proof : Given the result of the previous Lemma, in order that
dwR(t)
dδ ≤ 0, as u ﬃcient
condition is that this derivative at time 0 is negative. This suﬃcient condition
is satisﬁed if and only if, evaluating
dwR(t)























I nt h eo p p o s i t ec a s e ,
dwR(0)
dδ ≥ 0 and it will continue being positive until
period t∗, where the second expression in the proposition is veriﬁed. For all
periods after t∗, the derivative will be negative. Q.E.D.
This proposition tells us that in a non-stationary environment, the eﬀect of the
separation probability on reservation wages is not always negative. If the weighted
average of b(t) from period 0 to T,
PV(b(0))
D(0) , is high enough with respect to the
present value of expected wages, we can ﬁnd an initially positive eﬀect which lasts
for t∗ periods. This is totally new and entirely diﬀerent from the results found
in a stationary environment: when the parameters of the model change with the
time for which the worker is unemployed, a higher separation rate can provoke
the reservation wage to be higher instead of lower than without considering such
separations. In other words, the worker may be more selective at the beginning
of his unemployment spell and this is the case when he enjoys a much better
situation than he expects to have in a possible job. However, as time passes, the
worker realizes that his income or his chances of a new oﬀer will be lower. But,
he also knows that if he is hired, even in the case of a future separation, he will
have access to greater values of all the parameters of the model. This fact means
that the reservation wage decreases very rapidly as time passes.13 That is, the
separation probability also aﬀects the time dependence of the reservation wage.
The following proposition tells us that when the unemployed worker considers
a future possibility of being unemployed, reservation wages will be even more
negatively time-dependent.
Proposition 4 If b(t) is decreasing, a higher separation probability will make
the negative time dependence of reservation wages even more negative.
Proof : As ∆wR(t)=wR(t+1)−wR(t), substituting each reservation wage by its












13Of course, this eﬀect comes from assuming that the situation at the beginning of the un-
employment spell is the same whatever the duration of the previous job was. This is clearly
at odds with the observed fact that, for example, unemployment beneﬁts depend on the length
of the previous job and on its associated wage. However, given the diﬃculty of controlling for
these aspects, I have omitted them in the analysis.
9Given that ∀t ∈ [T,∞) we have that ∆wR(t)=0 , then
d∆wR(T)
dδ =0




1+r < 0 because b(t) is decreasing.
Therefore, we have that a higher separation probability increases the negative






< 0 ∀t ∈ [0,T). Q.E.D.
Hence, the worker’s requirements for accepting job oﬀers will decrease even
more rapidly since he knows he could be unemployed again in the future. This
means that acceptance probabilities will increase quickly during the unemploy-
ment spell. Moreover, for certain values of the model’s parameters, acceptance
probabilities can be equal to one very soon during the unemployment spell.
I have carried out some simulations with the model in order to determine when
we can expect to observe positive or negative eﬀects of the separation probability
over reservation wages. In these simulations I have combined ﬁve possible values
for each of the parameters in the model to compute reservation wages and also
to check the condition stated in Proposition 3. From this proposition we know
that all the parameters in the model aﬀect on whether we obtain either a positive
or negative eﬀect from the separation probability over reservation wages. We
conﬁrm from these exercises that the most important factor to obtain an initially
positive eﬀect is the fact that the mean of the distribution of oﬀered wages has
to be suﬃciently low with respect to the value of unemployment time. Moreover,
we obtain that the reaction of the studied derivative to a 50% change on the
baseline parameters (see the note to Figure 1) is more than proportional only for
the mean of oﬀered wages, E(w), the value of unemployment time at period 0,
b(0), and for the coeﬃcient of variation of oﬀered wages, CV(w).14 In Figure 1 we




1−rD(0) , is positive only for
certain combinations of b(t) and the parameters associated to the distribution of
oﬀered wages. Given the values used in the simulations, the level of b(t) at period
0 has to be at least 80% larger than the mean oﬀered wage in order to obtain
an initially positive eﬀect of the separation rate.15 The coeﬃcient of variation
of oﬀered wages is also very important. The larger this coeﬃcient is, the higher
b(0) h a st ob ei nr e l a t i o nt ot h em e a no ﬀered wage in order to observe a positive
eﬀect of the separation probability on reservation wages at time zero.
To conclude, the eﬀect of the separation probability on non-stationary reserva-
tion wages is quite important. Not only can we obtain a positive sign in the deriv-
ative of reservation wages with respect to the separation probability, but I have
14The elasticity of the condition stated in Proposition 3 to a 50% increase in each parameter
(in absolute value) is −4.2 for E(w), 2.5 for b(0) and −2.4 for CV(w). Hence, the higher the
mean or the coeﬃcient of variation of oﬀered wages and the lower the value of unemployment
time, it gets more diﬃcult to obtain a positive eﬀect of the separation probability over reservation
wages. Other parameters show elasticities lower than 0.4.
15In a country like Spain, where severance payments are quite high, it should not be very
strange to have high values of unemployment time at the beginning of the unemployment spell.
10also found that the time dependence of the reservation wage will be even more
negative when the probability of being separated from the job increases. Hence,
taking into account this parameter is even more important in non-stationary
search models than in stationary ones.
3 Structural estimation
The estimation of the model has been undertaken by means of Spanish data:
the Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey (Encuesta Continua de Pre-
supuestos Familiares (ECPF)) for the period 1985-1996. The ECPF is a rotat-
ing panel which interviews about 3,200 households every quarter. One eighth
of the sample is renewed quarterly and hence an individual can be followed
for a maximum of two consecutive years. This source gives information about
unemployed workers during their spells of unemployment and also about their
post-unemployment wages, in addition to information on consumption and other
household characteristics.
The estimation sample consists of unemployed household heads, which is the
only group within the ECPF whose the educational level is reported. I have
also restricted the sample to married men with non-working spouses in order
to reduce heterogeneity since, given the estimation procedure, I am not able to
consider many regressors.
The individuals in the sample are all entrants to unemployment. The observed
spells can be either complete, if the worker subsequently exits from unemploy-
ment, or censored, if he does not. For the complete spells, the re-employment
wage (for those who continue answering the survey two quarters after exiting
from unemployment) is taken to be the labor income of the second quarter of
employment.16
As we can see in Table 1, there are 631 completed spells of unemployment
and 493 censored spells. Of the former, 326 have an observed re-employment
wage. The histogram of re-employment wa g e s( w h i c ha r ee x p r e s s e di nr e a lt e r m s
of December 1996) can be seen in Figure 2.
Although the ECPF is a quarterly survey, it is possible to calculate monthly
values of the variables. Monthly data is preferable because it will better reﬂect
the nonstationarity of the job search behavior, and the changing patterns of
the parameters are likely to be estimated far more clearly.17 In order to obtain
monthly data, a few transformation rules have been applied. They are explained
in Appendix B.
16T h er e a s o nf o rd o i n gt h i si st or e d u c em e a s u r e m e n te r r o ra b o u ti t sa m o u n t ,w h i c hi ss i m p l y
quarterly income.
17Hence, the time period in our discrete-time model is of one month. This length could repre-
sent quite a long time in some economies, which might create problems in the estimation of the
oﬀer arrival rate. However,this is not a problem for Spain where the duration in unemployment
is generally long enough to imply monthly oﬀer arrival rates lower than one.
11The model has been estimated structurally by using both the monthly data
previously described and the usual assumption (see Van den Berg, 1990 or Wolpin,
1987) that wages are lognormal.18 But the diﬃculties in the process of estimation
make other simplifying assumptions necessary. This is because the estimation
procedure involves calculating the reservation wages at each evaluation of the
likelihood function. However, it is computationally very time-consuming to do
this for each worker. The solution I have adopted is to restrict the heterogeneity
of the sample and to divide the workers into groups based on a few dichotomous
variables.
In the results I present, there are ﬁve explanatory variables which makes
48 diﬀerent worker types. The ﬁrst is Skill, w h i c hi sm e a s u r e db yt h el e v e lo f
education: a skilled worker is one who at least has attended High School. Age
is the second variable and is divided into three groups (younger than 30 years
old, Age 18-30; between 30 and 45 years old, Age 30-45; and older than 45
years old, Age 45-65). Thirdly, there is a binary variable, High Unemployment,
indicating the periods where the unemployment rate is higher than the mean in
the whole period, 21.5%. I have also split the sample between observations before
and after 1992 because the Unemployment Insurance system changed in Spain
at the beginning of this year. Finally, I use a variable termed Beneﬁts which
indicates whether or not the individual has access to unemployment beneﬁts.19
Moreover, this variable will be diﬀerent before and after 1992. Given that the
design of Unemployment Insurance in Spain changed in 1992,20 Beneﬁts is equal
to one when the replacement ratio was the highest in the whole period (80%
before 1992 for the ﬁrst six months of unemployment) and will take a relative
value with respect to that one in the rest of cases. Obviously when the worker
has no unemployment beneﬁts, this variable is set equal to zero.
In the estimation, a monthly discount rate of 0.3% (i.e. a 3.66% annual rate)
was imposed and not estimated and T was set to 24 months so as to calculate
the ﬁnal condition for the reservation wage. Diﬀerent discount rates have also
been tried and the estimation results change only marginally. With respect to the
18It is well-known that not all wage oﬀer distribution function satisﬁes the recoverability
condition which is crucial for identifying the model (See Flinn and Heckman, 1982). One function
which satisﬁes it is the lognormal and this is the main reason for choosing it. Moreover, this
function works well also in Wolpin (1987) and ﬁts the empirical distribution of accepted wages
(See Figure 3).
19This variable requires further comment. It indicates not only whether the unemployed
worker actually receives unemployment beneﬁts or not, but also whether he has received them.
The basic idea behind this distinction is the following: in order to correctly estimate the eﬀect
of beneﬁts on a structural estimation, we would need to know the complete sequence of beneﬁt
receipt over the spell of unemployment of each worker, both for workers with or without a com-
plete spell. This requirement is not entirely satisﬁed by the data currently used. So, we have to
follow an intermediate solution which will not fully depict the structural eﬀect of unemployment
beneﬁts.
20Before 1992 the replacement ratio was 80% for the ﬁrst six months of unemployment, 70%
between the seventh and the twelfth and 60% afterwards. After the reform in 1992 the replace-
ment ratio was 70% the ﬁrst six months of unemployment and 60% afterwards.
12separation probability, given I have no data on employment duration, I cannot
directly estimate this parameter. But I will estimate it from a diﬀerent dataset,
Social Security registers for the same period, and will also use these estimated
values for each worker’s group in the structural estimation. The results from this
auxiliary estimation are shown in Appendix C.
3.1 The likelihood function
There are not many papers that attempt to estimate dynamic programming mod-
els of individual behavior in structural terms. In the context of job search models,
some important references would be Lancaster and Chesher (1983), Miller (1984),
Narendranathan and Nickell (1985) and Frijters & Van der Klaauw (2003). How-
ever, Wolpin (1987) stands for one of the most inﬂuential articles in this area,
which provides the basis for the maximum likelihood estimation used in this pa-
per. This paper develops a discrete-time model of search, which is non-stationary
because it assumes a ﬁnite horizon of search. It is estimated by maximum like-
lihood, and uses data on duration, accepted wages and a few individual charac-
teristics.
The estimation technique presented here is clearly inspired by Wolpin’s tech-
nique but it contains a new element: unobserved heterogeneity. I will ﬁrst explain
the likelihood function without taking into account unobserved heterogeneity, and
afterwards, I will consider the modiﬁed function which controls its presence.
In the sample of unemployed workers there are three types of individuals:
those with complete spells and an observed re-employment wage, those with
complete spells but without an observed re-employment wage and ﬁnally, those
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Given this likelihood function and taking into account the reservation wage,
equation (4), we can estimate the parameters of the model, α(t),b (t),δ , ¯ W, σu
and σε, provided they are all identiﬁed.
21vi is an indicator variable which takes a value of 1 if the re-employment wage of worker i is
observed and zero otherwise. ci is an indicator of censoring: it takes a value of 1 if the individual
i has a complete spell and zero otherwise. Ti represents worker i’s unemployment spell duration
and Woi is his observed re-employment wage. Finally, yit is equal to one if the individual i has
his last observation, di, at period t.
13The general idea behind identiﬁcation is as follows: given that we have data
on accepted wages, along with data on unemployment duration, the parameters
of the wage oﬀer distribution, ¯ W,σu and σε will be clearly identiﬁed in the ﬁrst
component of the likelihood function. Furthermore, given that, due to the eﬀect
of the separation probability, the acceptance probability is equal to one for some
workers, I can identify the oﬀer arrival rate in both the second and the third
components of the likelihood function. Finally, the separation probability, δ, and
the value of time for unemployed workers, b(t), could be identiﬁed by making use
of the system of reservation wages from 0 to T. However, without any data on
previous employment spell durations or data on the value of unemployment time,
the distinction between these two parameters can be quite unclear. This is the
reason why I am not going to directly estimate it but to impose it to be equal to
some previous estimates.
3.1.1 The likelihood function with unobserved heterogeneity
The necessity of restricting the heterogeneity in our sample means that a lot
of sample heterogeneity will not be captured by the explanatory variables used.
This problem, together with the fact that unobserved heterogeneity generates
spurious negative duration dependence in the estimation, calls for the control of
unobserved heterogeneity in the hazard rate.
Since I do not have multiple spells, unobserved heterogeneity cannot be con-
trolled by using a ﬁxed eﬀect approach. However, I can apply a random eﬀect
technique as the one used, for example, in Flinn and Heckman (1982). In order
not to further restrict the estimation procedure, I will estimate the distribution
of unobserved heterogeneity with a techniq u ei n s p i r e di nH e c k m a na n dS i n g e r








where F(η) is the cumulative distribution function of η, which is a discrete func-
tion with two mass points, η1 and η2.22 These mass points are selected in order
to verify the assumption of E(η)=0 , which is necessary given the presence of
a constant term in the value of unemployment time. Hence, only one point will
be estimated and the other one proceeds from this assumption. Besides, the
probability p for the variable η to be equal to its value η1 is also estimated.
22I have used just two mass points in the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity. It
is known that the increase in the number of mass points could be a way of improving the
control for unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, a promising avenue for improving our control
for unobserved heterogeneity in structural models would be the analysis of how the estimation
results change as the number of mass points increases. This exercise could be complementary
to that of Baker and Melino (2000) but it is left for future research.
14The function Li(η) is the likelihood function described in the previous sub-
section, where its arguments are all functions of the unobserved heterogeneity
variable, η.
The addition of unobserved heterogeneity as a two mass point distribution
function adds a new dichotomous variable to the estimation procedure. Hence,
we have 96 types of workers (48 in the case without unobserved heterogeneity), so
I need to compute reservation wages for each type of worker in every evaluation
of the likelihood function.
I have carried out some simulations to understand to what extent we can
jointly identify the eﬀects of unobserved heterogeneity and duration dependence
in the unemployment hazard rate. I have generated forty random samples of
500 workers with a few binary variables similar to those present in our data
set23 and I have applied to them the estimation procedure previously described.
For those exercises which deal with the presence of unobserved heterogeneity
one of the generated binary variables is dropped in diﬀerent parameters of the
model and assumed to be the unobserved heterogeneity term. We have tried
diﬀerent speciﬁcations with respect to this term. The results are shown in Table
2. It contains this heterogeneity in both the mean of oﬀered wages and the
value of unemployment time, which is the speciﬁcation we use in our estimation,
but also other alternative speciﬁcations with this heterogeneity term in diﬀerent
parameters of the model.
The ﬁrst conclusion from these simulations is that almost all parameters are
well identiﬁed given typical signiﬁcance levels. This is obtained for both the model
which take and do not take into account unobserved heterogeneity. However, it
can be seen that the parameters that show some problems are the constant in
both the variance of oﬀered wages and the one in the value of unemployment
time. Maybe because of the presence of measurement errors in wages, the joint
identiﬁcation of these two parameters, using only the structure of the model to
obtain reservation wages is poor. With respect to the introduction of unobserved
heterogeneity, I have found that the estimation procedure identiﬁes quite well its
presence and its diﬀerential eﬀect with respect to duration dependence. That is,
when the time dependence of the oﬀer arrival rate is −0.13, the estimation pro-
cedure makes the duration dependence coeﬃcient be, on average, −0.137 with
a mean standard error of 0.02. The same is true for the time dependence of
the value of unemployment time: its true value is −0.1 and its mean estimated
value is −0.096 with a mean standard error of 0.03. Comparing the four diﬀer-
ent speciﬁcations shown, we can see that the best one in terms of minimizing
the distance between the true and estimated values of the parameters is the one
which includes unobserved heterogeneity in both the mean of oﬀered wages and
the value of unemployment time: the probability of the unobserved heterogeneity
distribution, which is equal to 0.5 when generating the data, is estimated to be,
23These variables are included, respectively, in the oﬀer arrival rate, the mean and the variance
of oﬀered wages, and in the value of unemployment time.
15on average, 0.489 with a mean standard error of 0.05 and the ﬁst mass point in
its distribution has a true value of −0.25 and the estimated one is −0.208,w i t h
a standard error of 0.02. Hence, from these results we can conclude that the esti-
mation procedure is able to identify the parameters in the model24 and, secondly,
the presence of unobserved heterogeneityi nap a r a m e t e rw i t hac l e a re m p i r i c a l
counterpart, oﬀered wages, helps also the identiﬁcation of this heterogeneity..
The selected functional forms for the parameters of the model are shown in
Table 3. The oﬀer arrival rate, α(t), is parameterized using the extreme value
distribution function. The idea is to use a proportional assumption for the un-
derlying continuous oﬀer arrival rate. It is well known (see Meyer, 1990), that
in discrete time, a continuous proportional hazard rate follows this distribution.
The other parameters are assumed to be exponential because of the assumption
of lognormal wages, in order to reduce their scale or to ensure they are positive.
These parameters have some exclusion restrictions based on previous estimations
which give us the best parameterization in terms of signiﬁcance and likelihood
values.
With respect to the parameterization of the oﬀer arrival rate, I distinguish
between people with and without access to unemployment beneﬁts. It may be
argued that the access to unemployment beneﬁts should not only alter the value of
time for the unemployed worker, but also his search eﬀort. Although not explored
here, we would therefore expect the oﬀer arrival rate of such an individual to be
diﬀerent to that of a worker without beneﬁt s . W eh a v et or e m e m b e rt h a tt h i s
variable does not represent unemployment beneﬁts, but is merely an indicator
of whether the worker has access to them or not, taking into account also the
decreasing pattern of such beneﬁts. Nevertheless, estimates without this indicator
in the oﬀer arrival rate are far less accurate in terms of likelihood values and
signiﬁcance of other parameters.
3.2 Results
The main results of the structural estimation can be seen in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4 shows the estimated coeﬃcients of the model both when unobserved het-
erogeneity is and is not controlled for, under the previously estimated separation
rates (its mean value is 4.9%). Table 5 shows the predicted values for the main
elements in the model. It also presents the main predictions for the two estimated
groups with respect to unobserved heterogeneity.
The ﬁrst result shown in Table 4 veriﬁes that the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity in the data cannot be refuted (both estimated parameters are sig-
niﬁcant at 5% and even the test of the probability p b e i n ge q u a lt o1h a sa
t-statistic of -4.34). Moreover, the likelihood ratio of a test of no unobserved het-
erogeneity has a value of 12.64 with a p-value less than 1%. As it is well known,
24Although this is not a proportional hazard model, we think that an argument similar to the
one in Elbers and Ridder (1982) helps to identify our model: the present of diﬀerent regressors
in each parameter of the model helps their identiﬁcation.
16these parameters are not identiﬁed under the hypothesis of no heterogeneity. In
fact, the distribution of the LR test under this hypothesis is a mixture of the
chi-square with one and with three degrees of freedom. Instead of obtaining the
empirical distribution of this statistic by a Monte Carlo test, we approximate
this by taking the chi-square with three degrees of freedom as the approximate
distribution of the LR test in order to reject the hypothesis of no heterogeneity.25.
Hence, there is unobserved heterogeneity in the data but we can also conﬁrm from
this table that the control of this element does not actually aﬀect the duration
dependence of the parameter where it is introduced. As the model which controls
for unobserved heterogeneity is more general, we will focus on its results.
Duration dependence is estimated in the oﬀer arrival rate, α(t), a n di nt h e
v a l u eo ft i m ef o ru n e m p l o y e dw o r k e r s ,b(t). We can observe that there is a strong
negative duration dependence in both parameters: a 6.41% monthly decrease in
b(t) and a 12.85% mean monthly decrease in α(t) which is much higher than the
2.5% found in Wolpin (1987) for the oﬀer arrival rate using US data. Furthermore,
both duration dependence terms are highly signiﬁcant even when we control for
unobserved heterogeneity.
As far as the skill variable is concerned, we can see that although not very
signiﬁcant, there are more oﬀers for skilled unemployed workers than for unskilled
ones, as in Van den Berg (1990), and the oﬀered wages are considerably higher
for these workers. The same result was found by Wolpin (1987). However, the
main eﬀect of skill is on the variance of wages, which is much higher for skilled
workers.
The eﬀect of having access to unemployment beneﬁts is very strong. Not
only is the value of time higher for the unemployed worker with such beneﬁts,
but their oﬀer arrival rate is also much lower (see Table 4). These results might
indicate a lower search eﬀort among this type of workers, reﬂected in a lower oﬀer
arrival rate. The thing is that the known fact of lower hazard rates for workers
with unemployment beneﬁts can be interpreted much more accurately within this
structural estimation.26 Another interesting result is the fact that the eﬀect of
having such beneﬁts is not so negative before 1992, that is, when the beneﬁts
were a bit higher at the beginning of the unemployment spell but with a more
decreasing pattern throughout the spell. We obtain that comparing it to having
no beneﬁts, both before and after the 1992 reform, the mean unemployment
duration has increased by 6.4% after the reform implemented in 1992. Given
that the rest of factors which could be inﬂuencing such duration is controlled by
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence calculation, we can conclude that this increase must
be caused by the reduction in the decreasing pattern in the replacement rate.
The estimated values of α(t) and E(w) are quite reasonable: the oﬀer arrival
rate at the sample mean values of both the regressors and the eﬀect of unobserved
25This can be seen in Ridder (1987). I would like to thank this author the help with this
issue.
26We should not forget, however, that the estimation is not totally structural with respect to
this variable.
17heterogeneity begins at 27.12% in the ﬁrst month of unemployment and has
a value of only 3.98% fourteen months later. This value is higher for skilled
unemployed workers: 33.23% in the ﬁrst month and 5.05% in the fourteenth.
The estimated mean oﬀered wage, E(w), at the sample mean of the regressors, is
115,506 pesetas, around 883 dollars per month (at the December 1996 exchange
rate), which is only 7.82% lower than the mean monthly accepted wage in the
sample (see Table 1). Finally, the value of the parameter b(t) is estimated to be
verye high, although it decreases rapidly as the spell of unemployment lengthens.
However, its value is still more than 50% higher than both the mean oﬀered
wage and the reservation wage throughout the fourteen studied months of the
unemployment spell. This high initial value could be on account of the severance
payments received after being separated from the previous job.
In Table 5 we have the eﬀect of unobserved heterogeneity. The estimated
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity reveals the existence of two groups27
(See Table 4): with an 78.02% probability, the worker has a higher value of un-
employment time and a higher expected oﬀered wage. This eﬀect of unobserved
heterogeneity means that this group of workers have comparatively high reserva-
tion wages and hence, lower hazard rates. The remaining 17.88% of the sample
has lower values of unemployment time and lower mean oﬀered wages. Hence,
their reservation wages are lower and their hazard rates are greater than those of
the ﬁrst group of workers.
The real variation of oﬀered wages is estimated to be too low: only 44.40%
of the total wage variance is accounted for by real variation of wages. However,
this percentage is higher, 53.7%, in periods of low unemployment, from 1987 to
1992 and, mainly, for skilled workers, 70.4%. Although measurement error is
present in our data, due to the wage’s construction procedure, this result may be
a consequence of the soft joint identiﬁcation problem of b(t) and the variance of
oﬀered wages found in the simulation exercises presented in the previous section.
Estimated reservation wages and hazard rates can be obtained according to
these estimated parameters. Reservation wages decrease very quickly with un-
employment duration (See Table 5), just as the theoretical model predicts, and
are higher for skilled unemployed workers (162,830 pesetas for skilled workers,
i.e. 1,183 dollars, and 152,146 pesetas, 1,094 dollars, for the unskilled ones in
the ﬁrst month of unemployment). Still, it is noticeable that reservation wages
start oﬀ at quite high levels, although their decreasing pattern is very important
during the fourteen months analyzed. For sample mean values of the regressors,
the reservation wage in the ﬁrst month of unemployment is 32.4% higher than
the mean of the distribution of wages but, after 14 months of unemployment,
the reservation wage is equal to zero in view of its highly decreasing pattern.
This results mainly from the eﬀect of the separation rate. In fact, I obtain that
the separation probability has a strong eﬀect on reservation wages. Moreover,
27Remember that, given we have to assume that E(η)=0 , the second mass point can be
obtained from this condition, given the estimation of the ﬁrst one.
18the positive impact on reservation wages at the beginning of the unemployment
spell, predicted by our model, is present in the results: if we evaluate these
results with a 10% higher separation probability, reservation wages are higher for
the ﬁrst period in unemployment and lower afterwards.
Such low reservation wages after some months in unemployment lead, as in
Van den Berg (1990), to high acceptance probabilities. In Spain, the accep-
tance probabilities are even greater than in that paper: after 5 months, they are
p r a c t i c a l l ye q u a lt oo n e( s e eF i g u r e3w h e r ew ed i s t i n g u i s hb e t w e e nt h o s ew i t h
and those without unemployment beneﬁts). However, the acceptance probability
begins at a low level, 9.97% at the beginning of the spell (opposed to a mean
value of 77% in Van den Berg, 1990) although it grows rapidly, reaching a value
equal to one in 6 months for the larger unobserved heterogeneity group and in 4
months for the smaller group. This time pattern is quite diﬀerent to that found
previously in other papers and, given the theoretical result of our model, we can
conclude that it is mainly due to the consideration of the separation rate.
The ﬁnal result of this model deals with the unemployment hazard rate. This
rate is the product of the oﬀer arrival rate and the acceptance probability. As
shown in Figure 4, where the estimated hazard is compared with the Kaplan-
Meier empirical one, we ﬁnd an initially increasing pattern until the fourth month
of unemployment. Then it decreases, and becomes equal to the oﬀer arrival rate
as the acceptance probability approaches one. The initial increase in the hazard
rate is due to the large increase in the acceptance probabilities.
The hazard rates for workers with and without access to unemployment ben-
eﬁts are, as shown in Figure 5, very diﬀerent. The known stylized fact found in
some reduced-form estimations, see García-Perez (1997) or Bover et al. (2002), is
also found here: a worker without unemployment beneﬁts has higher probabilities
of exiting unemployment in every month of the spell. But since we have already
undertaken a structural estimation, we can interpret this result and conclude
that in the early stage of the spell, the main element at work is the acceptance
probability, which is much larger for those without unemployment beneﬁts, but,
once this probability is equal to one, the diﬀerence between the two groups of
workers remains the same because the oﬀer arrival rate is still comparatively high
for those without such beneﬁts.
Finally, although from Figure 4 we can have some visual intuition that the
model adjusts quite well to the data, we have also performed some exercises to
evaluate the goodness of ﬁt of our model. Given the characteristics of the work-
ers in the sample, I have simulated, using the structurally estimated parameters,
their behavior throughout their unemployment spells. That is, we have sim-
ulated when they will exit from unemployment for those who actually do. We
can see in Table 6a that the structural estimated parameters generate durations
a bit longer than the real ones: 3.7 months versus 3.9 months in the simula-
tion. The main diﬀerence is that the model generate quite fewer durations of less
than 3 months. However, the model predicts the reemployment wage quite well.
Another exercise, shown in Table 6b is comparing the duration distribution, non-
19parametrically estimated by the Kaplan-Meier estimator, with a reduced-form
estimation and with our structural estimation. As can be seen, the diﬀerences
are quite low although we continue obtaining a bit longer durations using our
structural estimated parameters. In fact the mean predicted duration, using the
Kaplan-Meier estimates is 4.5 months and under the structural estimation, this
mean duration is 5.0 months.
To conclude, the estimation of the search model shows that Spanish unem-
ployed workers do not particularly diﬀer from unemployed workers in other coun-
tries: their acceptance probabilities are very high except for the ﬁrst four to
six months of unemployment (see Wolpin, 1987 for US data or Van den Berg,
1990 for the Netherlands). Thus, the main mechanism at play in the process of
becoming employed is the arrival of oﬀers from employers. The oﬀer arrival rate,
in spite of its initially high value, is very low for workers who are unemployed
for more than 12 months, the so-called long-term unemployed. Thus, this group
of unemployed workers, along with the unskilled ones, have serious problems in
leaving unemployment in Spain.
3.3 Policy evaluation: the eﬀect of diﬀerent Unemployment In-
surance systems
I have used the structurally estimated parameters of our model to evaluate the
eﬀect of the current Spanish Unemploymen tI n s u r a n c es y s t e ma n da l s ot oc o m -
pare its results with alternative designs in terms of diﬀerent replacement rates.
The basic question we want to answer is whether a more decreasing pattern in
unemployment beneﬁts make the duration in unemployment being much lower or
not. In Table 7 we have the results of this exercise where we can conﬁrm that a
decreasing pattern in replacement rates is always better than a ﬂat rate in terms
of lower unemployment duration.28 We obtain that when the replacement rate is
10 percentage points lower every tree months, beginning at 70% as the current
system in Spain, the mean predicted unemployment duration is almost two weeks
lower than it is under the current system (a reduction of about 8.4% on mean
unemployment duration).
Recently, there has been a lot of controversy about the question whether
the Unemployment Insurance system is creating or not the correct incentives for
the unemployed to exit soon from unemployment. In a general equilibrium model
with moral risk, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997a) show that the optimal system is
the one which undergoes a not very decreasing replacement rate but an increasing
tax on workers, depending on their unemployment duration. However, this model
is not considering the possibility of job ﬁnishing after exiting from unemployment.
I would like to evaluate the eﬀects of this system using the structural estimates
of our non-stationary search model. Moreover, the presence of separations in this
model is a clear modiﬁcation with respect to the environment in Hopenhayn and
28The only case with a ﬂat replacement rate which makes unemployment duration to reduce
more than with a decreasing rate is when unemployment beneﬁts are 50% of the previous wage.
20Nicolini (1997a),29 so it is interesting to see whether the eﬀects they obtain are
also obtained here.30 In Table 7 we can see that the optimal tax they propose31
helps to decrease mean unemployment durations. With the current system, the
tax would make unemployment duration to be 2.0% lower. When we combine
the optimal tax with an alternative design for the replacement rate, we obtain
that the eﬀect is larger when the replacement rate is decreasing than when it is
ﬂat. With the design proposed in the former paragraph, the reduction in mean
unemployment duration would be about 10.1%. However, a ﬂat replacement rate
of, say, 70%, together with the optimal tax on workers make mean unemployment
duration to be 6.2% higher that it actually is under the current system in Spain.
We interpret this result as the eﬀect of not taking into account the separation rate
in a non-stationary environment. As the probability of being separated from the
job, once the worker accepts the oﬀer, is quite high in Spain, the main incentive
for the worker to exit as soon as possible is to be in front of a highly decreasing
ﬂow of income when unemployed. Hence, the worker internalizes that even after
being ﬁred again in the future, his situation as unemployed will be much better
than in the middle of the current unemployment spell. This is the reason why in
a labor market with a high turnover rate, as is the Spanish one (see García-Pérez
and Muñoz-Bullón, 2003), the incentives for workers to quickly accept job oﬀers
come not only from what will happen after accepting such oﬀer but also from
what is happening in the current unemployment spell.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper presents a non-stationary job search model where jobs do not last
indeﬁnitely. When the unemployed worker is looking for a new job, he takes into
consideration that once employed he may be unemployed again in the future.
This future risk should mean that in a normal situation, he will reduce his reser-
vation wages, because if he loses his job in the future, he will be unemployed
again. However, given the nonstationarity of the process, at the beginning of the
unemployment spell, the worker can be in quite a good situation with respect to
29Although these two authors also considers the possibility of turnover in a more recent paper,
Hopenhayn & Nicollini (2002), they have no calibrated ﬁgures for the optimal unemployment
insurance system in this case.
30The same authors have also a calibrated version of their model for the Spanish economy (see
Hopenhayn & Nicolini, 1997b). However, their optimal system is derived under no turnover.
Hence, we cannot apply directly their proposed ﬁgures to our model. Nevertheless, we will try
to compare the results for the Spanish economy with their proposed optimal tax and diﬀerent
alternatives for the replacement rates. Pavoni (2003) also presents a model of optimal Unem-
ployment Insurance with a calibrated proposal for the Spanish economy but again under no
turnover.
31Hopenhayn & Nicollini (1997b) proposed a subsidy to quick job acceptance, going from
2.7% if the worker exits from unemployment after just one month till 0.1% if he exits after
seven months in unemployment. For those with more than seven months in unemployment,
they propose a tax increasing with unemployment duration. The tax goes from 0.3% in the
eighth month of unemployment to 3.2% after 15 months.
21his expectations for the future. Therefore, we can also observe higher reserva-
tion wages in the ﬁrst steps of the unemployment spell when the separation rate
is higher. Hence, in an economy where there exists a high turnover rate and a
high value of unemployment time, we can ﬁnd longer unemployment duration be-
cause of this new eﬀect of the separation probability found in this non-stationary
environment.
I have implemented a structural estimation of this search model for the Span-
ish economy using data which are observed at discrete intervals of time. Further-
more, the estimation procedure controls for the presence of unobserved hetero-
geneity by using the Heckman and Singer (1984) mixture technique.
One of the principal results in the estimation of the search model is the
increase of the re-employment probability (the hazard rate) up to the fourth
month of the unemployment spell, but it then decreases markedly. This result is
still true even when we control the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. Given
the heavily decreasing pattern of reservation wages, we interpret that in the
ﬁrst months of unemployment, the most inﬂuential factor is the rapid increase
of the acceptance probability. But as soon as these ﬁrst months pass, the only
element inﬂuencing the hazard rate is the oﬀer arrival rate, because acceptance
probabilities are, in fact, equal to one.
As for the other results, we have found that there are some diﬀerences between
skilled and unskilled unemployed workers: the oﬀer arrival rate and the mean of
the distribution of oﬀered wages are higher for the former. Furthermore, the
worker who receives or has received unemployment beneﬁts has a much lower
probability of exiting unemployment. The reason for this depends on whether we
are considering the early stages of unemployment or those coming afterwards. In
the former case, this is because those with unemployment beneﬁts have higher
reservation wages and thus, lower acceptance probabilities. From the fourth
month of unemployment onwards, however, the only diﬀerence is in the oﬀer
arrival rates, which are much higher for those without unemployment beneﬁts.
This may happen because they have a higher search eﬀort than those without
such beneﬁts.
Given this structural estimation, we have evaluated the Unemployment Insur-
ance system in Spain. We ﬁnd that a more decreasing pattern in unemployment
beneﬁts would make mean unemployment duration decrease by 8.4%. Moreover,
we have obtained that the optimal insurance proposed in Hopenhayn and Nicol-
ini (1997a) helps to reduce unemployment duration a bit more, from 22.8 to 20.5
weeks, 10.1%. However, we ﬁnd that the optimal tax on workers they propose
needs a suﬃciently decreasing replacement rate so that it could work out in the
Spanish economy.
22Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
This proof consists of: ﬁrstly, proving the following Lemma which, basically, requires
that ∆w0
R(t) < 0 for (i) and (ii) hold, and, secondly, proving that ∆w0
R(t) < 0.
Lemma 5 If assumptions (A1)-(A6) are satisﬁed and if, for every t ∈ [0,T), we have
that ∆w0
R(t) < 0,t h e n :
(i) wR(t) <w 0
R(t),
(ii) ∆wR(t) < 0.
Proof: Suppose that at some t ∈ [0,T) wR(t) ≥ w0
R(t) holds. Then, because of
the relationship between wR(t) and w0
R(t) we will have that ∆wR(t) > 0. However,
given that wR(t) and w0
R(t) are continuous functions and, by the Lemma’s assumptions,
∆w0
R(t) < 0, it cannot be true that wR(T)=w0
R(T), which must be veriﬁed at time
T given the assumptions of the model. Thus, the opposite must hold: wR(t) <w 0
R(t)
a n da st h i si m p l i e s ,t h a t∆wR(t) < 0.Q . E . D .
N o ww eh a v et op r o v et h a tw0
R(t) is a decreasing function of t under all the assump-
tions (K1)-(K4). The proofs for each of them are quite similar so we will show only the
proof under (K1), i.e. for b(t):
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If b(t) is decreasing in t, the right-hand side of this expression will be positive and




R(t),t) is increasing in w0
R(t), we will have that
w0
R(t) >w 0
R(t+1), that is, w0
R(t) is decreasing in how long the worker is unemployed.
Appendix B
In order to obtain monthly wages, we have compared the labor income and the unem-
ployment beneﬁts declared in the correspondent quarter. If there are no unemployment
beneﬁts, the monthly wage is the declared labor income divided by three. If there are
unemployment beneﬁts, their amount is compared with the labor income: if the beneﬁts
are bigger than 80% of the labor income (70% for periods after 1992:2), then the monthly
wage is the total amount declared as labor income. If the beneﬁts are less than 80% of
the labor income, the monthly wage is the labor income divided by two. This rule is
based on the characteristics of the unemployment beneﬁts system in Spain before and
after 1992.
Calculation of monthly duration data is based also on comparing the labor income of
the ﬁrst and the last quarters the worker is unemployed, if positive, with the unemploy-
ment beneﬁts received that quarter or with the labor income of the following quarter. If
23there is no labor income in the ﬁrst quarter and the individual answers he is unemployed,
it is considered that he is unemployed during all the quarter. If the reported labor income
is low enough a duration of two months is imputed in the correspondent quarter but if
this income is suﬃciently high, it is considered that the worker has been unemployed for
only one month in that quarter.
Appendix C
The separation probabilities imposed in the structural estimation have been previously
estimated by means of a sample of 114.177 employment spells. This information comes
from Social Security registers, that is, administrative data. We have estimated these
probabilities as a discrete-time hazard rate (see, for example, García-Pérez & Muñoz-
Bullón (2003) for a similar approach) only for men and with the same variables we have
in the structural estimation. The only diﬀerence is that skill is measured in this dataset
as the required qualiﬁcation for the job and hence we have considered as skilled those in
the highest qualiﬁcation category. The results from this auxiliary estimation (the baseline
hazard is dropped just for the sake of saving space) is shown in Table C.1. The mean
separation rates in our sample is 4.94%, which is much lower, 3.11%, for skilled workers
than for unskilled ones, 5.08%. It is also much higher for periods of high unemployment,
5.82%, in the case young workers, 6.12% and after 1992, 6.09%, than for the opposite
categories (4.12%, 4.76% and 3.97% respectively).
Table C.1




Skill × Duration 0.116 14.08
Skill × Age18-29 0.108 5.95
Skill × High Unempl. -0.070 -3.60
Skill × Before92 -0.263 -13.58
Age18-29 0.204 7.95
Age18-29 × Duration 0.049 4.29
Age30-45 -0.067 -2.43
Age30-45 × Duration 0.045 3.70
High Unemployment 0.457 25.02
High Unempl. × Duration -0.150 -22.56
Before92 0.500 28.86
Before92 × Duration -0.305 -42.21
Before92 × High Unempl. -0.023 -1.46
Note : The likelihood value is -329,658.3 with 1,514,379 monthly observations.
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26Table 1
Distribution of unemployment duration and other variables in the
sample
Completed Spells Censored Spells
Number Percentage Mean Accepted Number Percentage
Wage
Months
0-1 68 10.78 63 12.78
1-2 73 11.57 69 14.00
2-3 112 17.75 82 16.63
3-4 115 18.23 34 6.90
4-5 77 12.20 27 5.48
5-6 47 7.45 36 7.30
6-7 30 4.75 12 2.43
7-8 41 6.50 8 1.62
8-9 18 2.85 23 4.67
9-10 14 2.22 14 2.84
10-11 14 2.22 6 1.22
11-12 9 1.43 23 4.67
12-13 6 0.95 12 2.43
13-14 5 0.79 10 2.03
14-15 2 0.32 74 15.01
Age1830 93 14.74 128,078 67 13.59
Age3045 293 44.43 130,096 172 34.89
Skill 40 6.34 159,640 39 7.91
With beneﬁts 383 60.70 123,928 345 69.98
TOTAL 631 125,309 493
Note : Mean accepted wages are in 1996 Spanish pesetas (exchange rate: 130.6
pesetas/dollar).
27Table 2
Identiﬁcation with the estimation procedure: some simulations results
Without unobserved heterogeneity
Coef. a0 a1 a2 e0 e1 v0 v1 b0 b1 b2 r0
True -1 -0.13 0.4 11.5 0.3 -3.4 0.4 12.5 -0.1 -0.3 2
Estim. -0.996 -0.131 0.412 11.503 0.291 -3.277 0.275 12.078 -0.140 -0.363 1.920
St. Error 0.12 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.13 0.38 0.07 0.23 0.37
With unobserved heterogeneity in E(W) and b(t)
Coef. a0 a1 e0 v0 b0 b1 r0 pη 1
True -1 -0.13 11.25 -3.4 12.25 -0.1 2 0.5 -0.25
Estim. -0.854 -0.144 11.222 -2.948 12.452 -0.096 2.681 0.489 -0.208
St. Error 0.16 0.02 0.04 0.22 0.24 0.03 0.50 0.05 0.02
With unobserved heterogeneity in E(W)
Coef. a0 a1 e0 v0 b0 b1 r0 pη 1
True -1 -0.13 11.25 -3.4 12.5 -0.1 2 0.5 -0.25
Estim. -1.068 -0,114 11.626 -2.817 12.378 -0.396 3.371 0.331 -0.186
St. Error 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.20 0.76 0.29 0.81 0.08 0.04
With unobserved heterogeneity in b(t)
Coef. a0 a1 e0 v0 b0 b1 r0 pη 1
True -1 -0.13 11.5 -3.4 12.25 -0.1 2 0.5 -0.25
Estim. -0.923 -0.139 11.481 -3.173 12.259 -0.210 1.527 0.534 -0.947
St. Error 0.13 0.01 0.09 0.17 1.16 0.07 0.50 0.24 1.47
With unobserved heterogeneity in α(t)
Coef. a0 a1 e0 v0 b0 b1 r0 pη 1
True -0.8 -0.13 11.5 -3.4 12.25 -0.1 2 0.5 -0.25
Estim. -0.667 -0.137 11.481 -3.129 12.015 -0.140 2.350 0.458 -0.342
St. Error 0.15 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.55 0.08 0.64 0.14 0.12
Notes : The parameters take the following form:
α(t)=1− exp(−exp(a0 + a1 × t + a2 × var1)),
E(w)=ee0+e1×var2+η,b (t)=eb0+b1×t+b2×var3+η,
Va r(w)=ev0+v1×var4,ρ 2 =
Va r (w)
Va r (w)+Va r (ε) = er0
1+er0 .
- In the second panel we show only the relevant parameters.
- The distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity term is a discrete one with
two mass points. The probability of η = η1 is p. In the estimation with
unobserved heterogeneity, diﬀerent regressors in the corresponding parameter
is dropped, being its eﬀect taken as the one of unobserved heterogeneity.
28Table 3
Functional forms of the estimated parameters
Job oﬀers arrival rate:
α(t,η)=1− exp(−exp(β1 + β2 × dur + β3 × skill + β4 × beneﬁts + β5 × beneﬁts × before92))
Distribution of wages:










¯ W =e x p( β6 + β7 × skill + β8 × age1830 + β9 × age3045 + β10 × η)
σ2
u =e x p( β11 + β12 × high unempl. + β13 × skill)
σ2
ε =e x p( β14)
V a l u eo ft i m ef o rt h eu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e r :
b(t)=e x p( β15 + β16 × dur + β17 × beneﬁts +β18 × beneﬁts × before92 + η)
29Table 4
Main results of the structural estimation
without Unob. Het. with Unob. Het.
Parameter Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
αi(t)
Constant -0.335 -1.792 -0.476 -2.937
Duration -0.163 -9.803 -0.147 -9.328
Skill 0.271 0.753 0.263 0.957
Beneﬁts -1.104 -5.128 -1.102 -5.777
Beneﬁts × Before92 0.259 1.610 0.228 1.527
¯ Wi(η)
Constant 11.588 267.149 11.596 405.927
Skill 0.031 1.773 0.015 0.133
Age18-29 0.053 2.375 0.044 1.042




Constant -5.508 -6.362 -3.757 -7.702
Skill 0.206 0.659 1.493 2.103
High Unemployment 1.020 1.450 -1.102 -2.048
σ2
ε
Constant -2.305 -25.291 -2.749 -14.195
bi(t,η)
Constant 12.015 100.021 12.338 87.594
Duration -0.029 -3.401 -0.066 -6.940
Beneﬁts 0.572 2.774 1.419 4.219





No. of observ. 6,134 6,134
30Table 5
Predicted values for the main elements of the model
t α(·) φ(·) ¯ F (wR(·)) wR(·) b(·)
Mean values for all variables:
0 27.13 2.70 9.97 152,993 549,241
4 16.14 16.03 99.36 79,393 421,296
14 3.98 3.98 100.00 0 217,095
For the group with η1 :
0 27.13 0.10 0.35 170,155 625,817
4 16.14 16.00 99.18 89,888 480,034
14 3.98 3.98 100.00 0 247,363
For the group with η2 :
0 27.13 11.96 44.12 92,055 277,343
4 16.14 16.14 100.00 42,129 212,737
14 3.98 3.98 100.00 0 109,624
With access to Unempl. Beneﬁts (after 1992):
0 21.45 0.88 3.81 179,736 829,266
4 12.56 12.56 100.00 36,198 636,091
14 3.49 3.49 100.00 0 274,494
Without access to Unempl. Beneﬁts (after 1992):
0 46.90 13.13 28.01 124,872 239,524
4 29.67 29.33 98.84 84,723 183,728
14 7.80 7.80 100.00 0 94,675
Skilled workers:
0 33.23 4.01 12.06 162,830 549,241
4 20.12 10.90 54.17 114,402 421,296
14 5.05 5.05 100.00 13,884 217,095
Unskilled workers:
0 26.70 2.78 10.42 152,146 549,241
4 15.86 15.84 99.83 76,057 421,296
14 3.90 3.90 100.00 0 217,095
Notes : ¯ F (wR(·)) = 1−F (wR(·)). The ﬁrst three columns are percentages and the
other two are expressed in 1996 pesetas. The predictions are carried out
using the model with unobserved heterogeneity.
31Table 6a: Goodness of ﬁtt e s t s :
simulated data for complete unemployment spells
Sample Values Simulation
Mean duration 3.686 3.930
Duration (Stand. dev.) 2.915 3.263
%d u r .∈ [0,3] months 58.32% 48.26%
%d u r .∈ [4,6] months 24.41% 30.26%
%d u r .∈ [7,14] months 17.27% 21.48%
Reemployment wage (mean) 126,810 121,339
Reemployment wage (stand.dev.) 43,700 23,215
Notes : The estimated parameters have been used for predicting the duration in
unemployment and the reemployment wage of each worker in our sample.
This table shows the predicted values once we have generated 50 diﬀerent
simulated durations and reemployment wages for each worker in the sample.
Table 6b: Goodness of ﬁtt e s t s :









0 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
1 93.95% 96.67% 97.29%
2 87.04% 89.63% 92.29%
3 75.59% 79.42% 83.64%
4 62.36% 68.26% 70.92%
5 52.91% 58.14% 59.55%
6 46.75% 49.94% 51.16%
7 42.38% 43.61% 44.87%
8 36.15% 38.81% 40.06%
9 33.32% 35.11% 36.32%
10 30.86% 32.19% 33.38%
11 28.17% 29.84% 31.03%
12 26.37% 27.92% 29.14%
13 24.92% 26.35% 27.59%
14 23.55% 25.11% 26.33%
Note : The reduced form estimation has been carried out with the same variables
used in the structural estimation and a polynomial on the logarithm of
duration for capturing the duration-dependence in the hazard rate.
32Table 7
Simulations with diﬀerent Unemployment Insurance regimes
Mean predicted durations
Without optimal tax With optimal tax
Weeks Diﬀerence Weeks Diﬀerence
Without U.B. 13.2
With actual U.B. 22.8 22.4 -2.0%
70% (always) 24.7 +8.2% 24.3 +6.2%
60% (always) 22.9 +0.2% 22.4 -2.2%
50% (always) 21.1 -7.8% 20.4 -10.5%
70% - 60% - 50% - 40% (each 4 months) 21.2 -7.1% 20.8 -8.8%
70% - 60% - 50% - 40% - 30% (each 3 months) 20.9 -8.4% 20.5 -10.1%
Note : The predicted durations are calculated under the mean values for all vari-
ables but the separation rate which is imposed to be the mean one in our
sample from 1992 onwards (6.09%).
33Figure 1: Simulation Results:
































Note: The baseline parameters for these simulations are b(t) = 200∗exp(−0.04t),
α(t)=0 .3 ∗ exp(−0.1t),E (w) = 100,C V(w) = 40%,r=0 .3%,δ=5 % .
The parameter in the horizontal axis is b(0).
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